This question asks whether people sent to prison for committing crimes should forfeit every right they have, or whether some rights must remain even behind bars.
Question type: Consider the view
An ETG General Paper original study guide to the 2022 A-Level GP Paper 1 essay on ethics & philosophy. Not affiliated with, or endorsed by, UCLES, Cambridge Assessment or SEAB. A study aid, not an official answer.
The view assumes rights are a single bundle that conviction can switch off wholesale, when imprisonment by design removes some rights (liberty, movement) while the case for removing others (the vote, dignity, safety) is entirely separate.
degree: the question is not whether prisoners lose any rights, since they obviously lose liberty, but how far that forfeit extends, and the answer turns on which rights and why.
How to approach it. Examine the claim that imprisonment should strip all rights, separating the rights a sentence legitimately removes from the ones it cannot, before deciding how far the view holds.
Imprisonment rightly removes the rights a sentence is built to remove, above all liberty and movement, but it cannot remove all rights, because some rights are the precondition of a just system rather than privileges it grants, and a state that strips them stops punishing crime and starts mirroring it.
There is real moral force in the idea that a person who took another's liberty, property or life has no standing to demand their own be respected, and victims understandably find talk of prisoners' rights an insult to their suffering. But retribution proportioned to the crime is not the same as total forfeiture: a thief has not consented to be tortured, and treating every prisoner as having abandoned all claims collapses the proportionality that makes punishment just rather than merely vengeful, so the retributive instinct supports calibrated loss, not 'all'.
People imprisoned for their crimes do lose rights, and they should, beginning with the liberty the sentence is built to take; but 'all their rights' fails, because the rights to bodily safety, dignity and a path back to lawful life are the conditions of a just system, and a state that removes them punishes itself as much as the prisoner.
The view rests on a false picture of what rights are: they are not a single possession the state hands over and can confiscate, but a relationship that binds the state as much as the citizen, so the real question is not how many rights a prisoner keeps but what kind of state we become by claiming the power to revoke them at will.
A murderer did treat his victim's right to life as cancellable, and the relational argument can read as a philosopher's indulgence to someone who has buried a child, so the view that such a person should keep their rights demands a serious answer rather than a lecture. But the answer is that the state's whole claim to moral authority over the offender rests on it not behaving as the offender did, so honouring the prisoner's rights is precisely how the state vindicates the victim's, by proving that rights are real and not merely the spoils of whoever holds power.
The view that prisoners should lose all their rights mistakes what a right is: rights bind the state as much as they protect the citizen, so a sentence restricts their exercise but cannot abolish them, and the deeper reason to refuse 'all' is that a state which can declare anyone right-less has stopped being the kind of state worth obeying.
Option A accepts that prisoners lose rights and calibrates degree, sorting which rights a sentence may remove and which it may not. Option B rejects the underlying picture, arguing rights are a relationship the state cannot simply switch off, so 'all' misdescribes what punishment does. Both are defensible: A is the measured 'which rights, and why' answer a marker expects; B is the higher-risk premise-rejecting move that scores if the relational frame is held cleanly.

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