When the 2019 paper asked whether globalisation should be welcomed or feared, the open world order still looked like the default. By 2026, with tariffs rising and supply chains splitting along political lines, the question reads differently, and for a trade-dependent Singapore it reads urgently.
A globalisation question rewards a student who can tell retreat from reorganisation. The open order is plainly under strain, but 'globalisation is ending' overstates it; trade is reshaping, not disappearing. Argue whether the change is a genuine unwinding or a reordering, and what either means for a small state that lives by trade.
Globalisation is a hardy GP theme. It appeared in 2018 on whether national boundaries are still justified, and twice in 2019, on whether globalisation should be welcomed or feared and on dealing with states with poor human-rights records. The strand recurs, and its meaning shifts with the world.
The shift is now unmistakable. Through 2025 and 2026 the US imposed sweeping tariffs and pushed trading partners to decouple from China, and global supply chains have begun to fragment along political lines. For an economy with a trade-to-GDP ratio above 300 percent, this is not abstract.
As foresight, not a forecast of wording: globalisation recurs, and the retreat framing is its freshest form, because the optimistic 2010s version of the question no longer matches the world a candidate is living in.
set at A-Level most recent appearance. Recurs through the late 2010s, then quiet while the real world turned against it. Overdue, and freshly meaningful.
These questions test whether you can read a trend without exaggerating it. 'Globalisation is over' is as lazy as 'globalisation is unstoppable'. The skill is calibration: distinguishing a genuine retreat from a reordering in which trade continues but along new, more political lines.
They also test whether you can think about national interest from where you stand. A large, self-sufficient economy can afford some decoupling; a small, trade-dependent state cannot. A Singaporean answer that ignores that asymmetry has skipped the most interesting part.
Two distinct, defensible routes through the question. A strong script commits to one and uses the other as the concession it answers, rather than sitting on the fence.
Tariffs, decoupling and the politicisation of supply chains are not a blip but a structural shift away from the rules-based openness a small trading state was built to rely on, and that is a real danger.
Trade is not collapsing but rerouting, and a nimble small state can prosper by diversifying partners and becoming the neutral hub a fragmenting world still needs, so the better response is adaptation, not panic.
The US negotiated a series of reciprocal trade agreements in 2025 and 2026 built to reduce partners' economic ties with China, signalling a turn from open multilateral trade toward politically aligned blocs.Source: PIIE, as of 2026-06
Analysts find clear evidence of nearshoring to neighbouring countries but little consistent evidence of full reshoring to the US, so supply chains are rerouting more than they are returning home.Source: IMF / academic supply-chain research, as of 2026-06
Studies estimate long-run global output losses of several percent under a full reshoring scenario, far more than under softer friend-shoring, which is itself an argument that complete decoupling is costly enough to be unlikely.Source: IMF working-paper estimates, as of 2026-06
The world is not closing. It is choosing sides. For a state that lives by trading with everyone, that is the harder problem.The small-state predicament

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